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ARTICLES
‘WHAT I TELL YOU THREE TIMES IS TRUE’*
Lawful Residence and Equal Treatment aft er Dano
Niamh Nic Shuibhne**
ABSTRACT
Th is comment examines three recent judgments of the Court of Justice – Alimanovic, 
Garcia-Nieto, and Commission v. UK – that further develop the connection between 
lawful residence in a host state and EU equal treatment rights, a critical legal premise 
of the Dano judgment. It demonstrates that this line of case law blurs legal concepts and 
legal statuses – social assistance and social benefi ts, for example; also citizens looking for 
work, those who have worked previously but no longer do, and those who need to rely on 
Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38 to establish lawful residence in the host state. It aims 
overall to contribute to debates about quality of law; about the quality of EU citizenship 
and free movement law in a substantive sense; but also about how EU law is made, applied 
and revised.
Keywords: European Union citizenship; free movement; lawful residence; social benefi ts; 
social security
* ‘Just the place for a Snark!’ the Bellman cried,
 As he landed his crew with care;
 Supporting each man on the top of the tide
 By a fi nger entwined in his hair.
 Just the place for a Snark! I have said it twice:
 Th at alone should encourage the crew.
 Just the place for a Snark! I have said it thrice:
 What I tell you three times is true’
 – L. Carroll, Th e Hunting of the Snark. 
** School of Law, University of Edinburgh. Th is work was partly funded by a Leverhulme Trust Major 
Research Fellowship.
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§1. INTRODUCTION
Th e Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in Dano on 
11 November 2014.1 Its fi nding that a Member State is not precluded from excluding 
nationals of other Member States from entitlement to social assistance when they do not 
have a right to reside there raised two signifi cant questions. First, the concept of lawful 
residence – essential for the purposes of claiming a right to equal treatment with host state 
nationals – was tied fi rmly in this judgment to the conditions established by Article 7(1) 
of Directive 2004/38.2 But it was not clear whether an EU citizen residing lawfully on 
another basis – whether, for example, based on national law3 or EU law4 – could still 
ground a right to equal treatment in primary EU law (Articles 18 and 21 TFEU). Second, 
while the Court confi rmed that an individual assessment of the fi nancial circumstances 
of the claimant should be undertaken to establish as a question of fact whether or not he 
or she possessed suffi  cient resources to satisfy the requirement of ‘suffi  cient resources for 
themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance 
system of the host Member State during their period of residence’ codifi ed in Article 7(1)
(b) of the Directive,5 a proportionality-driven assessment of the impact of exclusion from 
entitlement in each claimant’s particular case was not required.6 Might other ‘categories’ 
of claimants be therefore similarly and legitimately excluded from entitlement under 
national legislation or was the Dano rationale instead tied inherently to the interest of 
‘prevent[ing] economically inactive Union citizens from using the host Member State’s 
welfare system to fund their means of subsistence’,7 noting that it was also established 
as a matter of fact by the referring court in that case that the claimant was ‘not seeking 
employment and that she did not enter Germany in order to work’?8
Th e judgment in Dano provoked ‘an unusual stir’9 that questioned the intended 
scope of the Court’s reasoning and the implications of its choices.10 However, a clearer 
understanding of ‘social assistance’ – a crucial term used in several provisions of 
1 Case C-333/13 Dano, EU:C:2014:2358.
2 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, [2004] OJ L 158/77; Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 73–74.
3 E.g. Case C-85/96 Martí nez Sala, EU:C:1998:217.
4 E.g. Case C-480/08 Teixeira, EU:C:2010:83.
5 Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 80.
6 Contrary to the position in previous case law e.g. Case C-413/99 Baumbast, EU:C:2002:493, para. 91–
93.
7 Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 76.
8 Ibid., para. 66.
9 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, EU:C:2015:210, para. 4.
10 For an overview of relevant interpretative possibilities, see H. Verschueren, ‘Preventing benefi t tourism 
in the EU: a narrow or broad interpretation of the possibilities off ered by the ECJ in Dano?’, 52 Common 
Market Law Review (2015), p. 363.
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Directive 2004/38 – was established, since the Court repeated the defi nition that it had 
recently provided in Brey, that is
all assistance schemes established by the public authorities, whether at national, regional 
or local level, to which recourse may be had by an individual who does not have resources 
suffi  cient to meet his own basic needs and those of his family and who by reason of that 
fact may, during his period of residence, become a burden on the public fi nances of the host 
Member State which could have consequences for the overall level of assistance which may be 
granted by that State.11
Importantly, the Court seemed to suggest that the exclusions from entitlement to social 
assistance provided for in Directive 2004/38 worked not just in parallel with but above 
the system developed for coordination of social security under Regulation 883/2004.12 
Additionally, in an earlier line of case law, it distinguished ‘[b]enefi ts of a fi nancial nature 
which, independently of their status under national law, are intended to facilitate access 
to the labour market’.13 EU citizens seeking work in a host state could not be excluded 
from entitlement to this type of benefi t even though Article  24(2) of the Directive 
explicitly excluded them from entitlement to social assistance. However, the diff erence 
between both types of benefi t in substance had not been determined.
In a relatively short timeframe, the Court had the opportunity to add three further 
links to this particular ‘judicial chain’14 – Alimanovic,15Garcia-Nieto,16 and Commission 
v. UK.17 Fundamentally, questions about which EU citizens should be supported in host 
states, to what extent, and for how long are necessary to ask. As questions of policy, they 
have become fused with broader uncertainties about the worth of extending solidarity 
beyond state borders, and with broader debates on migration that are too oft en conducted 
in a toxic haze. As questions of law, they are less worked through than they need to be.
Refl ecting on the recent case law developments, this comment seeks primarily to 
contribute to debates about a concern for quality of law – the quality of EU citizenship 
11 Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 61, 63, citing Case C-140/12 Brey, EU:C:2013:565, para. 61. See also, Recitals 
10, 16 and 21 of the Preamble and Articles 7, 8, 12, 13, 14 and 24 of Directive 2004/38.
12 Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 63–64: ‘It must be stated fi rst of all that “special non-contributory cash 
benefi ts” as referred to in Article 70(2) of Regulation No. 883/2004 do fall within the concept of “social 
assistance” within the meaning of Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38. (…) Th at having been said, it 
must be pointed out that, whilst Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/38 and Article 4 of Regulation No. 
883/2004 reiterate the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, Article 24(2) of that 
directive contains a derogation from the principle of non-discrimination’. Regulation No. 883/2004/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security 
systems, [2004] OJ L 166/1.
13 Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze, EU:C:2009:344, para. 45.
14 A. Iliopoulou-Penot, ‘Deconstructing the former edifi ce of Union citizenship? Th e Alimanovic 
judgment’, 53 Common Market Law Review (2016), p. 1008.
15 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, EU:C:2015:597.
16 Case C-299/14 García-Nieto, EU:C:2016:114.
17 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, EU:C:2016:436.
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and free movement law in a substantive sense; but also about how EU law is made, applied 
and revised. It examines the implications of Alimanovic, Garcia-Nieto and Commission 
v. UK for the diff erent kinds of citizen-claimants involved in each case – the fi ndings of 
which concern those looking for work, those who have worked previously but no longer 
do, and those who need to rely on Article 7(1)(b) to establish lawful residence in the host 
state. It also refl ects – somewhat less abstractly than might have been the case before 
the recent ‘Brexit’ shock and the European Council negotiations that preceded it – on 
the rules that apply to those who have moved to another state and are working or self-
employed there. Ironically, while the commitment to equal treatment for EU workers 
in host states undoubtedly infl uenced the permissive foundations of EU citizenship 
law, limits restraining the latter may now be feeding back to revised thinking about the 
former.
§2. THE CASES
A. ALIMANOVIC
Ms Alimanovic and her three children are Swedish nationals, though the children were 
born in Germany in the 1990s. Th e family left  Germany in 1999 but re-entered in 2010. For 
less than one year, that is from June 2010 until May 2011, Ms Alimanovic and her eldest 
daughter both worked in short-term positions. From 1 December 2011, when they were 
neither working nor self-employed, they received non-contributory subsistence benefi ts 
as benefi ciaries fi t for work under the applicable national rules; Ms Alimanovic also 
received non-contributory subsistence benefi ts for her two younger children. However, 
payment of all benefi ts was suspended aft er 31 May 2012. Th e referring court regarded 
Ms Alimanovic and her eldest daughter as jobseekers, meaning that their entitlement to 
subsistence benefi ts was precluded under the applicable national rules even though home 
state nationals would be entitled to the benefi ts in question in the same circumstances.18 
Advocate General Wathelet framed the legal problem raised by the case as
sensitive in human and legal terms. It will necessarily lead to the Court ruling both on the 
protection off ered by EU law to its citizens, as regards their fi nancial situation and their 
dignity too, and on the current scope of the fundamental right to free movement, a founding 
principle on which the European Union is built.19
Th e fi rst question concerned the nature of the benefi ts at issue. Neither the defi nition of 
social assistance nor its legal autonomy vis-à-vis Regulation 883/2004 as established in 
Brey and confi rmed in Dano had revealed whether or how the concept overlapped with 
18 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 34 and 40.
19 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 2.
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benefi ts ‘intended to facilitate access to the labour market’ – which fall outside the scope 
of the derogation from equal treatment prescribed by Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 
and which must, in consequence, be granted to jobseekers from other Member States 
when granted to home state nationals as a matter of equal treatment. Th e Court adopted 
the reasoning of Advocate General Wathelet on this point, guiding the referring court 
towards examining the ‘predominant function of the benefi ts at issue’ – if that is found
in fact to cover the minimum subsistence costs necessary to lead a life in keeping with human 
dignity [then] those benefi ts cannot be characterised as benefi ts of a fi nancial nature which are 
intended to facilitate access to the labour market of a Member State [but] must be regarded as 
‘social assistance’ within the meaning of Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38.20
Second, confi rming Dano, the Court reiterated that entitlement to social assistance on 
the premise of equal treatment requires that the claimant’s ‘residence in the territory 
of the host Member State complies with the conditions of Directive 2004/38’.21 On the 
facts of the present case, the Court examined whether Ms Alimanovic and/or her eldest 
daughter could establish residence on the basis of either Article 7(3) or Article 14(4)(b) 
of the Directive. Article 7(3) sets out when Union citizens who are no longer working or 
self-employed can retain that status and thereby claim lawful residence under Article 7(1)
(a). But Article 7(3)(b) requires that the citizen has worked for more than one year, ruling 
out, just, its relevance for the claimants in this case. Article 7(3)(c) states that citizens 
who had worked for less than one year retain worker status for six months – precisely the 
point at which payment of subsistence benefi ts was suspended in this case.
Article 14(4)(b) provides that an expulsion measure may not be adopted against a 
Union citizen or their family members where the Union citizen
entered the territory of the host Member State in order to seek employment. In this case, 
the Union citizens and their family members may not be expelled for as long as the Union 
citizens can provide evidence that they are continuing to seek employment and that they have 
a genuine chance of being engaged.22
Th e Court confi rmed that Ms Alimanovic and her eldest daughter could establish a 
right to reside in Germany on that basis, and therefore come within the scope of equal 
treatment to social assistance in principle.23 However, the Court stated that ‘[i]t follows 
from the express reference in Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 to Article 14(4)(b) thereof 
20 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 45–46 (emphasis added); referring to the Opinion of Advocate General 
Wathelet in Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 66–71.
21 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 49, citing Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 69.
22 Th e test in this provision draws from the judgment in Case C-292/89 Antonissen, EU:C:1991:8 where the 
Court connected residence rights for jobseekers to Article 45 TFEU.
23 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 57.
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that the host Member State may refuse to grant any social assistance to a Union citizen 
whose right of residence is based solely on that latter provision’.24
Finally, the Court addressed the ambiguity remaining aft er Dano about when a host 
state should (or need not) undertake assessments of individual circumstances, fi nding 
that
although the Court has held that Directive 2004/38 requires a Member State to take account 
of the individual situation of the person concerned before it adopts an expulsion measure 
or fi nds that the residence of that person is placing an unreasonable burden on its social 
assistance system (…) no such individual assessment is necessary in circumstances such as 
those at issue in the main proceedings.25
B. GARCIA-NIETO
Th e key diff erences between Alimanovic and Garcia-Nieto are that, in the latter case, the 
claimants were fi rst-time jobseekers and the disputed entitlement to non-contributory 
subsistence benefi ts concerned the fi rst three months of residence. Ms Garcia-Nieto is a 
Spanish national who moved to Germany with her daughter in April 2012. She registered 
as a jobseeker on 1 June and began work as a kitchen assistant soon aft erwards, receiving 
a salary from 1 July. Her partner, Mr Peña Cuevas, and his son arrived on 23 June, all 
four living initially with Ms Garcia-Nieto’s mother. On 30 July, the family applied for 
subsistence benefi ts – these were granted with the exception of benefi ts for Mr Peña 
Cuevas and his son for August and September, neither of whom were ‘family members’ 
of Ms Garcia-Nieto within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the Directive.26 National rules 
excluded Mr Peña Cuevas from entitlement to the benefi ts on the basis that he had resided 
in Germany for less than three months and was neither a worker nor self-employed at 
that time.
Unsurprisingly, the Court repeated the main fi ndings from Alimanovic – here, lawful 
residence was connected to Article 6(1) of Directive 2004/3827 while, again, the explicit 
derogation from equal treatment was found in Article 24(2) (‘the host Member State shall 
not be obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during the fi rst three months of 
residence’). On the question of individual assessment, the Court remarked that ‘if such 
an assessment is not necessary in the case of a citizen seeking employment who no longer 
has the status of “worker”, the same applies a fortiori to persons who are in a situation 
24 Ibid., para. 58.
25 Ibid., para. 59; citing Case C-140/12 Brey, para. 64, 69 and 78.
26 Ms Garcia-Nieto and Mr Peña Cuevas were not married and therefore not ‘spouses’ as per Article 2(2); 
his son was not therefore the direct descendant of Ms Garcia-Nieto’s spouse.
27 Case C-299/14 Garcia-Nieto, para. 41. Article 6(1) of the Directive provides that ‘Union citizens shall 
have the right of residence on the territory of another Member State for a period of up to three months 
without any conditions or any formalities other than the requirement to hold a valid identity card or 
passport’.
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such as that of Mr Peña Cuevas’.28 Further distinguishing citizens who carry out an 
economic activity in the host state, and addressing the relationship between Directive 
2004/38 and Regulation 883/2004, the Court concluded that ‘there is nothing to prevent 
such benefi ts being refused to nationals of other Member States who do not have the 
status of workers or self-employed persons or persons who retain such status during the 
fi rst three months of residence in the host Member State’.29 But what actually prevents 
– or conversely might not prevent – such refusal for workers or self-employed persons is 
returned to below.30
C. COMMISSION v. UK
Th e pre-litigation procedure that led to these proceedings commenced in 2008, based 
on ‘numerous complaints from nationals of other Member States resident in the United 
Kingdom that the competent United Kingdom authorities had refused to grant them 
certain social benefi ts on the ground that they did not have a right to reside in that 
Member State’.31
Th e Commission refi ned the scope of its action to focus on conditions regulating the 
payment of child benefi t and child tax credit, and to challenge the compatibility with EU 
equal treatment obligations of the requirement in national rules that a person claiming 
these benefi ts had to satisfy a right to reside test. Regulation 883/2004 establishes a 
‘habitual residence’ test for the payment of social security benefi ts; through criteria 
developed further in legislation and in case law, this is a factual ‘centre of interests’ 
test, the purpose of which is to determine the Member State of responsibility in the 
complicated mission of social security coordination.32
Additionally, Article 4 of the Regulation provides that ‘[u]nless otherwise provided 
for by this Regulation, persons to whom this Regulation applies shall enjoy the same 
benefi ts and be subject to the same obligations under the legislation of any Member State 
as the nationals thereof ’. Th e Commission argued that by requiring a right to reside 
– lawful residence – for persons claiming child benefi t and child tax credit, UK rules 
add a condition not provided for in Regulation 883/2004. In its view, the determination 
of habitual residence ‘cannot be infl uenced by the provisions of Article 7 of Directive 
2004/38’.33 Alternatively, the Commission contended that the lawful residence condition 
28 Ibid., para. 48.
29 Ibid., para. 51, citing Case C-140/12 Brey, para. 44 and Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 83.
30 See Section 3.B.2. below.
31 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 21.
32 See Regulation No. 987/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 
laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 on the coordination of 
social security systems, [2009] OJ L 284/1; and Case C-90/97 Swaddling, EU:C:1999:96, para. 29.
33 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, EU:C:2015:666, para. 
21. In the same paragraph, the Advocate General notes the Commission’s caution against a result in 
which application of the UK right to reside test could mean that ‘no Member State will be obliged to 
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‘results in direct, or at least indirect, discrimination, prohibited by Article 4 of Regulation 
No 883/2004’.34
Th e legal context of this case diff ers from the case law on legal residence that preceded 
it in one signifi cant respect. In Brey, Dano, Alimanovic and Garcia-Nieto, the benefi ts 
in question were classifi ed as special non-contributory benefi ts. Th e Court recognized 
that these benefi ts were provided for in Regulation 883/2004 but it super-imposed its 
defi nition of social assistance for the purposes of Directive 2004/38 over that legal 
framework. However, in Commission v. UK, as confi rmed by the Court, the two benefi ts 
in question ‘have the objective of helping to cover family expenses and are funded not 
from recipients’ contributions but from compulsory taxation’; according to established 
case law, ‘benefi ts which are granted automatically to families that meet certain objective 
criteria relating in particular to their size, income and capital resources, without any 
individual and discretionary assessment of personal needs, and which are intended to 
meet family expenses must be regarded as social security benefi ts’35 – that is, they are not 
also classifi able as social assistance benefi ts in the understanding of that term derived 
from Brey and the line of cases that followed it. In fact, the families in Dano, Alimanovic 
and Garcia-Nieto all received comparable child benefi ts in Germany and this was not 
contested in any of the three cases by the competent national authorities.
Addressing the fi rst part of the Commission’s argument, the Court disagreed that 
Regulation 883/2004 must be the sole source of conditions determining eligibility for 
social security benefi ts. Th e Court accepted that the Regulation
is intended not only to prevent the concurrent application of a number of national legislative 
systems to a given situation and the complications which may ensue, but also to ensure that 
persons covered by that regulation are not left  without social security cover because there is 
no legislation which is applicable to them.36
However, it also found that the relevant provision of the Regulation ‘is not intended to 
lay down the conditions creating the right to social security benefi ts’, meaning that ‘[i]t 
is in principle for the legislation of each Member State to lay down those conditions’.37 
Since the Regulation is all about the coordination of national social security schemes, 
the Court inferred that the measure ‘thus allows diff erent schemes to continue to exist, 
creating diff erent claims on diff erent institutions against which the claimant possesses 
pay certain family allowances to the persons concerned, despite the fact that the latter live in a Member 
State and have dependent children’. Th e facts in Dano provide a useful illustration of when that might 
be the case.
34 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 74.
35 Ibid., para. 55 and 60; see also, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Case C-308/14 
Commission v. UK, para. 46.
36 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 64.
37 Ibid., para. 65, citing Case C-140/12 Brey, para. 41 and Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 89.
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direct rights by virtue either of national law alone or of national law supplemented, 
where necessary, by EU law’.38
Without any discussion of the fact that the benefi ts at issue are not social assistance 
benefi ts,39 the Court then cited Brey and Dano to conclude that ‘there is nothing 
to prevent, in principle, the grant of social benefi ts to Union citizens who are not 
economically active being made subject to the requirement that those citizens fulfi l the 
conditions for possessing a right to reside lawfully in the host Member State’.40 However, 
inserting the Directive’s tiers of citizenship, which are premised on degree of economic 
activity undertaken (or not), into the Regulation has been strongly criticized.41 Using the 
Directive to override the scope of the Regulation in this way also calls into question the 
reasoning applied in cases such as Teixeira, which are premised precisely on a separation 
between the personal scope (Directive) and material scope (Regulation 492/2011) of 
claims about entitlement to benefi ts.42 And it raises questions about how much further 
the reach of the Directive might penetrate into other dimensions of material scope – 
including claims made by those working or self-employed in a host state, something that 
will be returned to below (Section 3.B.).
Meanwhile, in Commission v. UK, the Court disagreed with the Commission’s 
argument that the right to reside test distorted the Regulation’s habitual residence 
test; it is instead ‘a substantive condition which economically inactive persons must 
meet in order to be eligible for the social benefi ts at issue’.43 However, that fi nding 
does bridge to the Commission’s alternative argument, since the Court accepted 
that ‘a provision of national law must be regarded as indirectly discriminatory if it is 
intrinsically liable to aff ect nationals of other Member States more than nationals of 
38 Ibid., para. 67.
39 Compare Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 64. 
Th is question is returned to in more detail below.
40 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 68.
41 E.g. M. Cousins, ‘Th e baseless fabric of this vision: EU citizenship, the right to reside and EU law’, 23 
Journal of Social Security Law (2016), p. 104: ‘Th e reference to economically inactive persons makes 
sense in the context of Directive 2004/38 if one assumes that it is a shorthand for persons who do not 
have a right to reside as workers (and/or perhaps as jobseekers). However, it makes no sense at all in the 
context of Regulation 883/2004 which has its own diff erent scope ratione personae’.
42 Case C-480/08 Teixeira, para. 59: ‘if Article [10] of Regulation [492/2011] were to be interpreted as 
being limited, since the entry into force of Directive 2004/38, to conferring the right to equal treatment 
with regard to access to education without providing for any right of residence for the children of 
migrant workers, maintaining it would appear superfl uous aft er the entry into force of that directive. 
Article 24(1) of the directive provides that all Union citizens residing in the territory of the host Member 
State are to enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that State within the scope of the Treaty, and it 
has been held that access to education falls within the scope of European Union law’. Regulation No. 
492/2011/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement 
for workers within the Union, [2011] OJ L 141/1.
43 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 72.
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the host state and there is a consequent risk that it will place the former at a particular 
disadvantage’.44
Turning then to the question of justifi cation, the Commission had accepted that 
‘a Member State may wish to ensure that there is a genuine link between the person 
claiming the benefi t and the competent Member State’ – however, for social security 
benefi ts, it restated that ‘it is Regulation 883/2004 itself which establishes the means of 
testing whether such a genuine link exists (in this particular case, by applying the habitual 
residence criterion), and the Member States may make no changes to its provisions and 
add no supplementary conditions’.45 But the Court’s position on justifi cation follows on 
from its leniency on that very question, concluding that
the need to protect the fi nances of the host Member State justifi es in principle the possibility 
of checking whether residence is lawful when a social benefi t is granted in particular to 
persons from other Member States who are not economically active, as such grant could have 
consequences for the overall level of assistance which may be accorded by that State.46
Finally, in its evaluation of the proportionality of the condition, the Court agreed with 
the Advocate General that verifi cation of lawful residence invokes Article 14(2) of the 
Directive, which provides: ‘[i]n specifi c cases where there is a reasonable doubt as to 
whether a Union citizen or his/her family members satisfi es the conditions set out in 
Articles 7, 12 and 13, Member States may verify if these conditions are fulfi lled. Th is 
verifi cation shall not be carried out systematically’. Th e Court was satisfi ed that UK 
procedures complied with these criteria, fi nding that
the checking of compliance with the conditions laid down by Directive 2004/38 for existence 
of a right of residence is not carried out systematically and consequently is not contrary to the 
requirements of Article 14(2) of the directive. It is only in the event of doubt that the United 
Kingdom authorities eff ect the verifi cation necessary to determine whether the claimant 
satisfi es the conditions laid down by Directive 2004/38, in particular those set out in Article 7, 
and, therefore, whether he has a right to reside lawfully in United Kingdom territory, for the 
purposes of the directive.47
§3. COMMENT
Alimanovic, Garcia-Nieto and Commission v. UK entrench the basic Dano position on 
equal treatment for EU citizens: their right not to be discriminated against in a host state 
44 Ibid., para. 77, citing Case C-73/08 Bressol, EU:C:2010:181, para. 41. Th e question of whether the 
discrimination at issue was direct or indirect is considered further below.
45 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 24.
46 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 80, citing case law including Case C-140/12 Brey, para. 61 and 
Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 63.
47 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 84.
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is connected to Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/38, which is conditioned by a right to reside 
in that state, which is in turn conditioned by other relevant provisions of the Directive. 
It therefore seems far less likely that an applicant residing lawfully in a host state solely 
under national law (Martínez Sala) or another stream of EU law (Teixeira) could succeed 
– for ‘[t]he palette of [Directive-compliant] situations is clearly more restrained than that 
of situations coming “within the scope of application of the Treaties” which trigger the 
application of Article 18 TFEU’.48 Th e conditions established in the Directive are thus 
conferred with legal but also normative eminence in citizenship law, the implications 
of which will now be examined in more detail. Th e discussion fi rst looks in more detail 
at how the fundamental free movement premises of discrimination, justifi cation and 
proportionality played out in the recent case law. Th e relationship between the Directive 
and other sources of EU law – both primary and secondary – is then considered.
A. LAWFUL RESIDENCE, EQUAL TREATMENT AND DIRECTIVE 
2004/38
1. Th e nature of the discrimination
All three cases concerned diff erential treatment between home and host state nationals, 
but Commission v. UK raised an interesting question about the nature of discriminatory 
treatment concerning EU nationals. As mentioned above, we saw that ‘the Commission 
contended that the lawful residence condition results in direct, or at least indirect, 
discrimination, prohibited by Article  4 of Regulation No 883/2004’.49 Th e Court 
considered that the contested national condition amounted to indirect discrimination, 
since it is ‘intrinsically liable to aff ect nationals of other Member States more than 
nationals of the host state and there is a consequent risk that it will place the former at a 
particular disadvantage’.50 But what did the Commission try to argue in terms of direct 
discrimination, and why? In essence, it stated ‘that the right to reside test constitutes 
direct discrimination based on nationality, given that it involves a condition that applies 
only to foreign nationals because United Kingdom nationals who are resident in the 
United Kingdom satisfy it automatically’.51
48 A. Iliopoulou-Penot, 53 CMLRev. (2016), p. 1016. See further on the relationship between Article 24 of 
the Directive and Article 18 TFEU, N. Nic Shuibhne, ‘Limits rising, duties ascending: the changing legal 
shape of Union citizenship’, 52 CMLRev. (2015), p. 909–911. In Alimanovic, Advocate General Wathelet 
did consider briefl y (at para. 117–122 of the Opinion) whether Ms Alimanovic’s younger children may 
have residence rights under Article 10 of Regulation 492/2011 as the children of a former worker and 
to complete their education, which, as we know from Teixeira, did not attract the Directive’s right 
to reside conditions to be satisfi ed in order to raise an equal treatment claim in the context of social 
benefi ts.
49 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 74 (emphasis added).
50 Ibid., para. 77.
51 Ibid., para. 35.
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Th e Commission referenced the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Bressol 
to support this part of its claim. In that case, the Advocate General raised for debate the 
sometimes obscure dividing line between direct and indirect discrimination – drawing 
from case law on sex discrimination, she considered not just criteria explicitly framed as 
such, but also ‘necessarily linked to a characteristic indissociable from sex’.52 By analogy, 
‘discrimination can be considered to be direct where the diff erence in treatment is based 
on a criterion which is either explicitly that of nationality or necessarily linked to a 
characteristic indissociable from nationality’.53 Th e right to reside condition contested 
in Commission v. UK clearly meets that test ‘because UK nationals resident in the United 
Kingdom automatically fulfi l it’.54 O’Brien presents the reality here very clearly:
UK nationals do not ‘more easily satisfy’ the test; they do not ‘more oft en than not’ satisfy 
the test – they always and automatically satisfy the test and so are excused from meeting the 
condition. Only EU nationals must provide evidence of a right to reside. Only EU nationals 
can be excluded from entitlement due to economic inactivity.55
However, despite having emphasized the need to distinguish the right to reside condition 
in the national rules from the habitual residence criterion in Regulation 883/2004, the 
Court in fact blended the two once again in its reasoning on this point, fi nding that the 
UK rules generate unequal treatment between UK nationals and nationals of other states 
since ‘such a residence condition is more easily satisfi ed by United Kingdom nationals, 
who more oft en than not are habitually resident in the United Kingdom, than by 
nationals of other Member States, whose residence, by contrast, is generally in a Member 
State other than the United Kingdom’.56
Advocate General Cruz Villalón articulated the crux of the dilemma when he noted 
that ‘diff erence in treatment as regards the right of residence is inherent in the system 
and, to a certain extent, inevitable: by defi nition, a national of a Member State cannot be 
denied a right of residence in that State’.57 Th e ‘system’ that can be inferred here is that 
established by Directive 2004/38; since the Advocate General went on to reference the 
unequal treatment that Article 24(2) of this measure allows for in the context of social 
assistance. But, EU free movement law still places (legal) value on distinguishing between 
diff erent kinds of unequal treatment. In Bressol, Advocate General Sharpston argued in 
essence that some rules, in their eff ects, are as close to direct discrimination as you can 
52 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-73/08 Bressol, EU:C:2009:396, para. 52 (emphasis in 
original).
53 Ibid., para. 53.
54 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 22; see similarly, 
Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 35 and Section 2 of the UK Immigration Act 1971.
55 C. O’Brien, ‘Th e ECJ sacrifi ces EU citizenship in vain: Commission v UK’, 53 CMLRev. (2016) 
(forthcoming); emphasis in original.
56 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 78.
57 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 75.
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get without labelling it as such explicitly. In that case and in Commission v. UK, the 
Court declined to transpose to free movement law the more nuanced template applied 
in sex discrimination law, which allows for this kind of complexity to be recognized. By 
citing its judgment, and not the Opinion, in Bressol, the Court opted, without further 
discussion, for the less severe outcome – less severe in the sense that the main legal 
consequence that fl ows from classifi cation as indirect discrimination concerns the open-
ended range of public interests that a state can then seek to defend.
2. Justifi cation and proportionality
In the judgment in Commission v. UK – and since the defendant state was not confi ned 
to the limited Treaty grounds on which direct discrimination might be forgiven – the 
Court ruled that
the need to protect the fi nances of the host Member State justifi es in principle the possibility 
of checking whether residence is lawful when a social benefi t is granted in particular to 
persons from other Member States who are not economically active, as such grant could have 
consequences for the overall level of assistance which may be accorded by that State.58
Th e line of case law that the Court then cited in support of this point shows the low-
key yet profoundly signifi cant evolution of how the public fi nance defence has been 
handled in free movement law. Th is development can be traced through the Court’s own 
references. First, concern for the protection of public fi nances was acknowledged but 
balanced against – and presented overall as – a citizen-centred argument in Grzelczyk 
that ‘benefi ciaries of the right of residence must not become an unreasonable burden on 
the public fi nances of the host Member State. Directive 93/96 (…) thus accepts a certain 
degree of fi nancial solidarity between nationals of a host Member State and nationals of 
other Member States, particularly if the diffi  culties which a benefi ciary of the right of 
residence encounters are temporary’.59 However, subsequently, we can observe both a 
more generalized version of that principle in Bidar and also a shift  in the expression of 
it more accommodating of the interests of the state (‘although the Member States must, 
in the organisation and application of their social assistance systems, show a certain 
degree of fi nancial solidarity with nationals of other Member States (…) it is permissible 
for a Member State to ensure that the grant of assistance to cover the maintenance costs 
of students from other Member States does not become an unreasonable burden which 
could have consequences for the overall level of assistance which may be granted by that 
State’).60 Now, the public fi nance defence features centrally in the defi nition of social 
58 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 80.
59 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk, EU:C:2001:458, para. 44.
60 Case C-209/03 Bidar, EU:C:2005:169, para. 56.
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assistance per se in Brey61 and Dano62 – ‘to which recourse may be had by an individual 
who does not have resources suffi  cient to meet his own basic needs and those of his 
family and who by reason of that fact may, during his period of residence, become a 
burden on the public fi nances of the host Member State which could have consequences 
for the overall level of assistance which may be granted by that State’.63
In Alimanovic, the Court reiterated the related point from Dano that it is a stated 
objective of Directive 2004/38 to ‘[prevent] Union citizens who are nationals of other 
Member States from becoming an unreasonable burden on the social assistance 
system of the host Member State’.64 It is widely observed that this approach subdues 
other objectives also plainly articulated in the preamble65 as well as recalibrating, more 
generally, the diminution of solidarity borders that was either (depending on your view 
of the progress of integration) refl ected or more consciously attempted by the Court in 
Grzelczyk.66 Th e line between apparently forbidden justifi cation grounds based on purely 
economic reasons, on the one hand, and permitted justifi cation grounds expressed in the 
language of public fi nance yet protecting broader aims and activities, on the other, is a 
diffi  cult one to draw.67 However, in the reactions to date to Alimanovic and Commission v. 
UK, the more practical dimension of demonstrating the problem for public fi nances has 
attracted particular criticism. Two related issues stand out in this context – the soft ness 
of proportionality scrutiny that results from the confi rmed move to systemic impact 
rather than individual circumstances assessment; and the prevalence of presumptions 
over proof.
As mentioned above, we saw that the Court expressly ruled out in Alimanovic the 
need for an assessment of the individual burden placed on the defendant state’s welfare 
system. Advocate General Wathelet had presented an alternative argument. While 
acknowledging that the ‘loss of the status of worker seems to be an appropriate, albeit 
restrictive, transposition of Article 7(3)(c) of Directive 2004/38’, he then considered that 
‘its automatic consequences for entitlement to subsistence benefi ts under SGB II seem 
61 Case C-140/12 Brey, para. 61.
62 Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 63.
63 Ibid. and Case C-140/12 Brey, para. 61.
64 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 50, citing Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 74. See also, Recital 10 of the 
preamble to Directive 2004/38.
65 Compare for example, Case C-434/09 McCarthy, EU:C:2011:277, para. 28: ‘With regard to Directive 
2004/38, the Court has already had occasion to point out that it aims to facilitate the exercise of the 
primary and individual right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States that 
is conferred directly on Union citizens by the Treaty and that it aims in particular to strengthen that 
right’.
66 On this point, see e.g. S. Giubboni, ‘Free movement of persons and European solidarity revisited’, 7 
Perspectives on Federalism (2015), www.on-federalism.eu/attachments/221_download.pdf, p. 13.
67 See e.g. Case C-20/12 Giersch, EU:C:2013:411, para. 47–56. See generally, J. Snell, ‘Economic justifi cations 
and the role of the State’, in P. Koutrakos, N. Nic Shuibhne and P. Syrpis (eds.), Exceptions from EU 
Free Movement Law: Derogation, Justifi cation and Proportionality (Hart Publishing, forthcoming 
2016), p. 12; S. Arrowsmith, ‘Rethinking the approach to economic justifi cations under the EU’s free 
movement rules’, 68 Current Legal Problems (2015), p. 307.
Niamh Nic Shuibhne
922 23 MJ 6 (2016)
to go beyond the general system established by that directive’.68 On that basis, and in a 
‘remarkable eff ort to fi t the reasoning in Dano with the fi ndings in judgments predating 
it’,69 he suggested that
it is important that the competent authorities of the host Member State, when examining 
the application of a Union citizen, economically inactive and in a situation like that of Ms 
Alimanovic and her daughter Sonita, take into account, inter alia, not only the amount and 
regularity of the income received by the citizen of the Union, but also the period during which 
the benefi t applied for is likely to be granted to them.70
He then drew from the Court’s case law on how a real link with the host state might be 
demonstrated, which ‘ought to prevent automatic exclusion from those benefi ts’.71 In 
particular, drawing from the judgment in Prete, he recalled that demonstrating a real 
link to the labour market also includes personal factors, such as family circumstances, 
as well as labour market criteria, such as ‘[h]aving worked in the past, or even the fact of 
having found a new job aft er applying for the grant of social assistance’.72
However, the Court provided three reasons for its decision to the contrary. First, since 
the Directive establishes a ‘gradual system’ concerning retention of the status of worker, 
that measure ‘itself takes into consideration various factors characterising the individual 
situation of each applicant for social assistance and, in particular, the duration of the 
exercise of any economic activity’.73 However, that statement just makes no sense – a 
‘gradual system’ established by legislation cannot take into consideration ‘various factors 
characterising the individual situation of each applicant for social assistance’. Neither 
does it take into account ‘the duration of the exercise of any economic activity’ in each 
individual situation. It establishes instead a general – and not an individual – framework, 
one that is based on fi xed time-points rather than more fl exible qualitative criteria. Th e 
genuine confusion for national authorities caused by these kinds of guidelines does have 
to be acknowledged as a concern when more qualitative criteria are used, and this is 
returned to under the second point below. But the ‘gradual system’ put in place by the 
Directive cannot explain the soft er guidance issued in consideration of the Breys – who 
68 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 103, citing Case C-140/12 
Brey, para. 77 (emphasis added).
69 A. Iliopoulou-Penot, 53 CMLRev. (2016), p. 1013.
70 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 103, citing Case C-140/12 
Brey, para. 78–79.
71 Ibid., para. 107.
72 Ibid., para. 111, citing Case C-367/11 Prete, EU:C:2012:668. See similarly, Opinion of Advocate General 
Wathelet in Case C-299/14 Garcia-Nieto, EU:C:2015:366, para.  79–90. Supporting this ‘distinction 
between fi rst time jobseekers (who are excluded from social assistance) and jobseekers who have already 
lived and worked in the host society (who cannot be automatically excluded)’, see also, A. Iliopoulou-
Penot, 53 CMLRev. (2016), p. 1013–1014.
73 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 60.
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had barely arrived in Austria from Germany when their social assistance claim was 
lodged. Consider, in contrast, the Alimanovic facts:
all three children were born [in the host State]; the family had lived there in the past for a 
considerable amount of time; they returned in 2010 apparently with the intention to settle; Ms 
Alimanovic and her daughter had already joined the workforce in Germany, which showed 
that they were willing and capable of entering into an employment relationship. Such factors 
were not and could not be taken into account by the Directive, which focuses on ‘the duration 
of the exercise of any economic activity’.74
If it is time to move on from the long-established approach75 to proportionality in 
citizenship law – one that examines not just the appropriateness and necessity of the 
legal provision, but of its impact when applied in individual cases –, then suggesting that 
the same task is or even could be performed by a legislative measure adds nothing useful 
to that debate.
Second, the Court also emphasised in Alimanovic that the clarity off ered by 
following the criteria set down in both the relevant national rules and Article 7(3)(c) 
of the Directive ‘guarantee[s] a signifi cant level of legal certainty and transparency in 
the context of the award of social assistance by way of basic provision, while complying 
with the principle of proportionality’.76 As indicated just above, this rationale is far more 
convincing, having particular regard to the implementation of rights challenge facing 
national authorities. Nevertheless, a fi rst quality of law problem, concerning the case 
law produced, is that, as also indicated above, the Court did not deal directly with its 
own previous case law – case law that had consistently pushed the individual assessment 
approach notwithstanding its practical weaknesses. Something changed aft er Brey; but 
that change has not been explained. A related risk is that, as we saw also in the discussion 
on direct/indirect discrimination, apparently simpler solutions cover rather than deal 
with the fact that the philosophy and the practice of free movement have become 
increasingly complicated. For example, while plainly acknowledging the diffi  culties and 
problems that fuzzier individual assessment tests do provoke, Iliopoulou-Penot equally 
cautions that aiming to reduce the problem through the turn that began in Dano but 
became much more overt in Alimanovic ‘might leave a dangerous imprint on the proper 
functioning of a general principle, which until now seemed inherent in the judicial 
application of norms of constitutional status’.77 However, it must also be pointed out that 
quality of law expectations apply to the draft ing of the Directive too; and to reviewing it 
when some problematic ambiguities, gaps and problems are demonstrated very plainly 
through recurring case law instances.
74 A. Iliopoulou-Penot, 53 CMLRev. (2016), p. 1024 which cites Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 60.
75 See further, N. Nic Shuibhne, 52 CMLRev. (2015), p. 894.
76 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 61.
77 A. Iliopoulou-Penot, 53 CMLRev. (2016), p. 1027.
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Th ird, the Court acknowledged that
the assistance awarded to a single applicant can scarcely be described as an ‘unreasonable 
burden’ for a Member State, within the meaning of Article  14(1) of Directive 2004/38. 
However, while an individual claim might not place the Member State concerned under an 
unreasonable burden, the accumulation of all the individual claims which would be submitted 
to it would be bound to do so.78
On this point, we see a dangerous victory for presumption – ‘all the individual claims 
which would be submitted to it’ – in contrast to the point made in Brey that
in order to ascertain more precisely the extent of the burden which that grant would place 
on the national social assistance system, it may be relevant, as the Commission argued at 
the hearing, to determine the proportion of the benefi ciaries of that benefi t who are Union 
citizens in receipt of a retirement pension in another Member State.79
Th e problem with presumption is that it feeds right into the tendency towards exaggeration 
already too dominant in debates about free movement; in Garcia-Nieto, even Advocate 
General Wathelet remarked that ‘granting entitlement to social assistance to Union 
citizens who are not required to have suffi  cient means of subsistence could result in 
relocation en masse liable to create an unreasonable burden on national social security 
systems’.80 In contrast, O’Brien rightly calls for both the procedures and standards 
of proof evident more generally in free movement law to (continue to) play a part in 
citizenship case law too: ‘while politically potent, the mere mention of public fi nances on 
its own should not close down all argument. Some actual (not abstract) threat to public 
fi nances ought to be shown, in light of the evidence that fears of EU national benefi t 
tourists are misplaced’.81
Here, Iliopoulou-Penot links the more problematic ‘indulgence’ of the Court as 
regards ‘the “cumulative eff ect” assertion in Alimanovic’82 to the cryptic Commission 
declaration that it had been provided with ‘information’ showing that ‘the type of 
exceptional situation that the proposed safeguard mechanism is intended to cover exists 
in the United Kingdom today’ with respect to the so-called emergency brake proposed as 
a pre-referendum concession, which will be returned to below (Section 3.B.2.).83
78 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 62.
79 Case C-140/12 Brey, para. 78 (emphasis added).
80 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-299/14 Garcia-Nieto, para. 71.
81 C. O’Brien, 53 CMLRev. (2016), forthcoming.
82 A. Iliopoulou-Penot, 53 CMLRev. (2016), p. 1027–1028.
83 Declaration of the European Commission on the Safeguard Mechanism referred to in paragraph 2(b) of 
Section D of the Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council, 
concerning a new settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union, February 2016; 
but presenting evidence to the opposite eff ect, including from the Commission itself, see C. O’Brien, 
‘Cameron’s renegotiation and the burying of the balance of competencies review’, Th e UK in a Changing 
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Th e Court’s judgment in Commission v. UK also illustrates another side of soft ened 
proportionality review. It can be recalled that the Court focused not on the proportionality 
of the right to reside condition per se but on how it was applied.84 From that perspective, 
it in turn placed considerable emphasis on the fact that verifi cation of lawful residence 
was compliant in its view with Article  14(2) of the Directive; in particular, it was 
practised ‘[i]n specifi c cases, where there is a reasonable doubt as to whether a Union 
citizen or his family members satisfy the conditions’ for lawful residence established 
by the Directive.85 Th e Court continued that data provided by a person claiming child 
benefi t or child tax credit would
reveal whether or not there is a right to reside in the United Kingdom, those data being 
checked subsequently by the authorities responsible for granting the benefi t concerned. It is 
only in specifi c cases that claimants are required to prove that they in fact enjoy a right to reside 
lawfully in United Kingdom territory, as declared by them in the claim form.86
Th e Court therefore concluded that checking for compliance with lawful residence was 
‘not carried out systematically and consequently is not contrary to the requirements of 
Article 14(2) of the directive’.87
Dismantling that analysis as ‘nonsense’, Cousins responds: ‘it is clear that there 
is systematic verifi cation of the right to reside in every case – it is only the degree of 
verifi cation which varies. Unsurprisingly, the UK authorities do not further verify a right 
to reside where it is clear that a claimant has such a right’.88 O’Brien further criticizes 
the reversal of the burden of proof eff ected by the judgment.89 Th e Court recalled that 
‘the Commission (…) has the task of proving the existence of the alleged infringement 
and of providing the Court with the evidence necessary for it to determine whether 
the infringement is made out’ – but continued that the Commission had ‘not provided 
evidence or arguments showing that such checking does not satisfy the conditions of 
proportionality, that it is not appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective 
of protecting public fi nances or that it goes beyond what is necessary to attain that 
Europe (2016), http://ukandeu.ac.uk/camerons-renegotiation-and-the-burying-of-the-balance-of-
competencies-review/.
84 For criticism of this point of confl ation, see e.g. C. O’Brien, 53 CMLRev. (2016), forthcoming: ‘It is the 
condition, not the checks, that is the main problem, and it is the condition that must be justifi ed once it 
has been shown to be discriminatory. Th e checks are a separate, though important issue’.
85 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 82.
86 Ibid., para. 83 (emphasis added).
87 Ibid., para. 84.
88 M. Cousins, 23 Journal of Social Security Law (2016), p. 104 (emphasis in original).
89 C. O’Brien, 53 CMLRev. (2016), forthcoming: ‘the Court decided that it was the Commission’s 
responsibility to show that the checks were disproportionate, were not appropriate, or went beyond 
what was necessary. Th is is a problematic reversal of the burden of proof, and requires the Commission 
to provide information that is in possession of the UK’.
Niamh Nic Shuibhne
926 23 MJ 6 (2016)
objective’.90 Here, the Court confl ates proof of infringement with substantiation of 
defence. Th is and the morphing of justifi cation and proportionality requirements more 
generally expose a series of quality of law problems in a substantive sense.
A fi nal question concerns the consequences that might arise if it is found that a person 
claiming social benefi ts does not have a right to reside in the host state. None of the 
relevant public authorities had brought the disputes to the threshold of deportation in 
Dano or its three successor cases to date. Aft er Dano, this practice raised questions about 
the responsibilities of states for citizens who became ‘tolerated’ in their territories but 
not supported there as a result.91 In Commission v. UK, Advocate General Cruz Villalón 
indicated quite clearly the direction in which he felt such responsibility lies:
any fi nding by the national authorities that that Union citizen does not have a right of 
residence under that directive because he does not fulfi l the requirements set out therein, 
regardless of whether this would carry an expulsion measure and despite the fact that it is 
merely declaratory, is ‘a decision [restricting] free movement of Union citizens’ within the 
meaning of Article 15(1) of that directive, which, as laid down in that provision, has the eff ect 
of activating the guarantees provided for in Articles 30 and 31 thereof.92
If fi ndings on lawful residence are required to be formalized in all cases in this way, how 
many – in reality – would not proceed to the next step of an expulsion measure? Aft er 
all, if the administrative machinery of the state is already engaged, continuing down the 
trajectory does not seem as burdensome as having stopped at refusing the benefi t in the 
fi rst place. Perhaps then we are entering a phase of ‘tolerance no more’, which may be a 
fairer refl ection and consequence of how citizenship law has developed – but maybe it is 
also fair to say that it does not seem very much like citizenship as a result.
B. DIRECTIVE 2004/38 AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
ARTICLES 18, 21 AND 45 TFEU
Th e super-norm status conferred on Directive 2004/38 – and especially on the conditions 
set down in Article 7(1)(b), given that most national rules challenged to date restricted 
entitlement to social assistance and/or social benefi ts concern persons who are not 
engaged in work or self-employed – also raises tricky questions about the relationship 
between the rights conferred on citizens by Articles 18, 21 and 45 TFEU, and of the 
diff erent legislative measures adopted to give eff ect to these (diff erent?) sets of primary 
rights. Th ree ways of conceiving that relationship might be relevant: the original, parallel 
90 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 85.
91 N. Nic Shuibhne, 52 CMLRev. (2015), p. 916, 926–927 and 933–934. See also, D. Th ym, ‘When Union 
citizens turn into illegal migrants: the Dano case’, 40 European Law Review (2015), p. 249.
92 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 95.
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view on specifi c expression; the consequences of hybrid status; and a newer sense of 
specifi c expression superseded.
First, the original view on specifi c expression refers to the idea that freedom of 
movement for workers in Article 45 TFEU was deemed to be a specifi c expression of the 
right to reside and move freely conferred on citizens more generally by Article 21 TFEU. 
Th e principal consequence was that situations that fell within the scope of Article 45 
were to be examined against that provision in the fi rst instance, with consideration of 
Article 21 TFEU only being necessary if the case could not be resolved on that basis.93 
Th is view suggested that Article 21 TFEU was a residual provision, called into being only 
when the economic freedoms were not otherwise triggered. However, second, in the case 
law on benefi ts payable to jobseekers, the Court fused the Treaty provisions together to 
construct ‘the hybrid system described in Collins’,94 that is
[i]n view of the establishment of citizenship of the Union and the interpretation in the case-
law of the right to equal treatment enjoyed by citizens of the Union, it is no longer possible to 
exclude from the scope of Article 4[5](2) [TFEU] – which expresses the fundamental principle 
of equal treatment, guaranteed by Article [18 TFEU] – a benefi t of a fi nancial nature intended 
to facilitate access to employment in the labour market of a Member State.95
Here, in contrast to the residual approach, Article 21 TFEU is blended with Article 45 
TFEU; freedom of movement of workers is infused with a legal added value extracted 
from free movement as a citizenship right, to enhance the scope of equal treatment. 
Importantly, the solution developed in Collins could not have been achieved by using 
either provision alone.
But it is arguable that, third, post-Dano, the limitations signalled in Article 21 TFEU 
– which are laid down not just in the Treaties but also ‘by measures adopted to give 
them eff ect’ – now supersede other specifi c expressions of free movement rights. In what 
follows, the implications of this shift  are fi rst demonstrated through discussion of the 
interplay of secondary legislation as concerns the nature of the benefi t at issue in recent 
case law. Th e implications of that reasoning for the rights of jobseekers and for the rights 
of migrant workers are then considered.
93 See e.g. Case C-104/06 Commission v. Sweden, EU:C:2007:40, para. 15–16. See similarly, for services, 
Case C-76/05 Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz, EU:C:2007:492, para. 34: ‘it should be noted that Article 21 
[TFEU], which lays down generally the right for every citizen of the Union to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States, fi nds specifi c expression in the provisions guaranteeing the 
freedom to provide services (…) If, therefore, the case in the main proceedings falls under Article [56 
TFEU], it will not be necessary for the Court to rule on the interpretation of Article [21]’.
94 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-22/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze, 
EU:C:2009:150, para. 34.
95 Case C-138/02 Collins, EU:C:2004:172, para. 63.
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1. Th e nature of the benefi t
Th e Court did have a classifi cation question in Alimanovic, since it needed to determine 
what, more precisely, constituted a benefi t intended to facilitate access to employment in 
a host state’s labour market. In his Opinion, it seems clear that Advocate General Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer envisaged an inclusive interpretation:
the objective of the assistance must be analysed according to its results rather than according 
to the formal structure of the benefi t (…) there may be ‘social assistance’ measures, as 
contemplated in Article  24(2) of Directive 2004/38, which promote integration into the 
labour market. In those circumstances, Collins demands that Article [45 TFEU] be applied 
and that social assistance be granted to persons seeking employment within the territory of 
the Union.96
Th e Court explicitly referred to his analysis in its judgment, confi rming that ‘the 
objective of the benefi t must be analysed according to its results and not according to its 
formal structure’.97 It noted too that national authorities should ‘not only (…) establish 
the existence of a real link with the labour market, but also to assess the constituent 
elements of that benefi t, in particular its purposes and the conditions subject to which it 
is granted’.98
At the level of fact, fi nancial assistance towards basic provision or housing has the 
‘result’ of facilitating access to the labour market. Of course it does. In Alimanovic, 
Adovcate General Wathelet acknowledged the ‘possibly mixed nature of the benefi t on 
the classifi cation of the measure (that is to say, the case in which the benefi t in question 
possesses both features relating to social assistance and features relating to integration 
into the labour market)’.99 However, we saw above that the Court ultimately followed 
his ‘predominant function’ method, which results in a more restrictive outcome when 
coupled with the Brey functional defi nition of social assistance.100 Th e nature of the 
benefi t question in Alimanovic thus involved a choice at the level of interpretation of 
concepts. What complicated the picture much further in Commission v. UK concerns 
the codifi cation of choices in secondary legislation. As noted above, one problem links 
back to how the Alimanovic/Garcia-Nieto reasoning on social assistance benefi ts was 
transposed to social security benefi ts without comment or explanation.101 To compound 
that problem, questions about determining the nature of the benefi t at issue exposed an 
ambiguity about how diff erent pieces of secondary legislation work together.
96 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-22/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze, para. 
57 (emphasis in original).
97 Case C-22/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze, para. 42.
98 Ibid., para. 41.
99 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-67/14 Alimanovic, para. 53.
100 See Section 2.A. above.
101 See Section 2.C. above.
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In his Opinion, Advocate General Cruz Villalón, having acknowledged that ‘the 
purpose of Regulation 883/2004 is to coordinate Member States’ social security systems 
in order to guarantee that the right to free movement of persons may be exercised 
eff ectively’ went on to state that the Regulation 
lays down a series of common principles which the social security legislation of all the Member 
States must observe and which, together with the system of confl ict of laws rules it contains, 
ensure that persons exercising their right to free movement and residence within the Union 
will not be adversely treated by the various national systems because they have exercised 
that right. One of those common principles is the principle of equal treatment under Article 4 
of Regulation No 883/2004 which, for the specifi c area of social security, embodies the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality which is applicable to all EU law 
under Article 18 TFEU.102
He also acknowledged that ‘whilst Directive 2004/38 takes account of the need to have 
recourse to social assistance benefi ts in the context of the lawfulness of residence, it is 
silent regarding social security benefi ts such as those at issue in this case’.103 Th at part of 
the analysis accorded with the submissions of the Commission.
However, the turn of argument then pursued changed the resolution of the dispute 
completely, and the reasoning applied could have implications far beyond the specifi cs 
of this case. Th e steps in the legal argument are critical. Th e Advocate General fi rst 
stated that Article 18(1) TFEU prohibits discrimination on the grounds of nationality 
‘[w]ithin the scope of application of the Treaties and without prejudice to any special 
provisions contained therein’; next, he pointed to the ‘measures adopted to give them 
eff ect’ part of Article 21(1). For the avoidance of any doubt, he referred also to the ‘limited 
nature’ of the freedom to move and reside as a Charter right, since, ‘[i]n accordance 
with Article 52(2) of the Charter, those rights are to be applied under the conditions 
and within the limits defi ned by the Treaties’.104 From a general starting point that ‘the 
EU legal order could hardly consist of a multiplicity of entirely separate compartments’, 
special emphasis was then placed on the fact that Directive 2004/38 had been adopted 
‘[w]ith a view to remedying this sector-by-sector, piecemeal approach to the right of free 
movement and residence and facilitating the exercise of this right’.105 Extrapolating a 
claim to legal hierarchy for the Directive on that basis, he concluded:
I cannot agree with the Commission’s assertion that ‘the concept of residence in Regulation 
No 883/2004 (…) is not subject to any legal preconditions’ (…). [If] EU law subjects the exercise 
of freedom of movement and residence to certain limitations and conditions, embodied in 
102 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz-Villalón in Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 49. (emphasis 
added).
103 Ibid., para. 64.
104 Ibid., para. 69.
105 Recital 4 of Directive 2004/38/EC.
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particular in Directive 2004/38, it seems clear that the provisions of Regulation No 883/2004 
cannot be interpreted in such a way as to neutralise the conditions and limitations accompanying 
the grant and proclamation of that freedom.106
Th e idea of the Directive’s limitations and conditions setting preconditions – over 
and above any other legislative provisions connected to free movement – is a critical 
interpretative step. Th e prohibition on discrimination expressed in Article  4 of the 
Regulation is sidelined as the expression of a ‘common principle’ that is ‘applicable to 
all EU law under Article 18 TFEU’. Directive 2004/38 is confi rmed all the more as the 
beginning and end of citizenship rights – their fl oor and their ceiling, as Spaventa puts 
it.107 Th en noting variable references to ‘social benefi ts’ and ‘social assistance’ in Brey, 
Dano and Alimanovic,108 the Advocate General concluded that ‘there is nothing in those 
judgments to indicate that such fi ndings apply exclusively to the social assistance benefi ts 
or the special non-contributory cash benefi ts with which those cases were concerned and 
not to other social benefi ts’.109
We saw above that the Court’s treatment of these questions was far briefer but also 
apparently diff erent. It emphasized more the coordination objective of the Regulation 
than the consolidation objective of the Directive. But the endpoint was the same: ‘there 
is nothing to prevent, in principle, the grant of social benefi ts to Union citizens who are 
not economically active being made subject to the requirement that those citizens fulfi l 
the conditions for possessing a right to reside lawfully in the host Member State’.110 Th is 
interpretation diminishes the Regulation at one level, since it enabled the strapping on of 
a lawful residence test from the Directive to the habitual residence test in the Regulation 
– even if the Court treated the two regulatory spaces as simply diff erent. However, in 
contrast to the precondition reasoning applied by the Advocate General, the Court did 
not displace the prohibition on discrimination captured by Article 4 of the Regulation.
Instead, the Court acknowledged an indirectly restrictive breach of it. But here, 
it did accept the Directive’s expression of lawful residence conditions as a justifi able 
discriminatory limit on the Regulation’s operation, leading O’Brien to note the irony 
that claimants ‘might only gain protection from discrimination if they have already 
106 Ibid., para. 72 and 73(emphasis added); see similarly, para. 77: ‘any diff erence in treatment between UK 
nationals and nationals of other Member States occurs at a stage before that of the practical application 
of Article 4 of Regulation No. 883/2004, and does not therefore aff ect its applicability in principle’.
107 E. Spaventa, ‘Citizenship: reallocating welfare responsibilities to the State of origin’, in P. Koutrakos, 
N. Nic Shuibhne and P. Syrpis (eds.), Exceptions from EU Free Movement Law: Derogation, Justifi cation 
and Proportionality, p.  42. Similarly, Jacqueson describes the Directive as the ‘backbone of Union 
citizenship’, see C. Jacqueson, ‘Back to business – the Court in Alimanovic’, BEUCITIZEN (2016), 
http://beucitizen.eu/back-to-business-the-court-in-alimanovic/.
108 See further on this point, H. Verschueren ‘Free movement of EU citizens: including for the poor?’, 22 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2015), p. 28.
109 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz-Villalón in Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 74.
110 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 68.
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passed a discriminatory test’.111 Both the Opinion and the judgment therefore affi  rm 
the super-norm reach of the Directive and, more specifi cally, its Article 7 conditions on 
lawful residence. Also, it may be recalled that the Court had ruled in Dano that ‘whilst 
Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/38 and Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004 reiterate the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, Article 24(2) of that directive 
contains a derogation from the principle of non-discrimination’.112 However, that 
diff erent interpretative approaches were applied to arrive at the same endpoint may yet 
have considerable implications, as restrictions on equal treatment move further into the 
formerly sacred space of economic activity.
2. Implications for the free movement of workers
Th e circumstances in Alimanovic represented a diffi  cult middle ground between citizens 
who are not, or are not yet, economically active and citizens who meet the defi nition of 
worker under EU law, since the claimants had undertaken economic activity in the host 
state but not of suffi  cient duration to comply with the criteria laid down in Directive 
2004/28 for retention of worker status.113 However, that defi nition is, more generally, 
acknowledged to set a low threshold of contribution to the host state in contrast to the 
high threshold of equal treatment then triggered. It is therefore surprising that the 
Court did not consider whether Ms Alimanovic or her eldest daughter might have rights 
under Article  45 TFEU directly.114 It had determined in Saint Prix that the criteria 
listed in Article 7(3) for the retention of worker status are not exhaustive, enabling it to 
secure continuity of worker status for a woman who stopped work for pregnancy and 
childbirth.115
While greater consistency of approach to the role of primary rights is needed, it was 
perhaps easier for the Court to extract protection directly from Article 45 TFEU for a 
criterion not contemplated at all by the Directive than for the criteria that are included 
there for former workers. It is perhaps also worth considering the sting in the Saint Prix 
judgment tail: where a former worker has been employed in a host State for more than one 
year, entitlement to social assistance on the premise of equal treatment with nationals of 
that state seems to be open-ended; but in Saint Prix, the Court attached a condition about 
returning to work ‘within a reasonable period’.116 Perhaps that dimension of Article 45 
TFEU could yet infl uence the interpretation of Article 7(3) of the Directive as well.
111 C. O’Brien, 53 CMLRev (2016), forthcoming.
112 Case C-333/13 Dano, para. 64 (emphasis added).
113 E.g. Case C-46/12 N, EU:C:2013:97, para. 40 and 42, i.e. a person performing ‘services for and under 
the direction of another person, in return for which he receives remuneration’ and pursuing ‘eff ective 
and genuine activities which are not on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely marginal and 
ancillary’.
114 See e.g. A. Iliopoulou-Penot, 53 CMLRev (2016), p. 1018.
115 Case C-507/12 Saint Prix, EU:C:2014:2007, para. 35–40.
116 Ibid., para. 41.
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To date, equal treatment for migrant workers as regards entitlement to social benefi ts 
rests on Article 7(2) of Regulation 492/2011, which provides very plainly that a worker 
from another state ‘shall enjoy the same social and tax advantages as national workers’. 
Additionally, the Court has interpreted ‘social and tax advantages’ very broadly: ‘in view 
of the equality of treatment which the provision seeks to achieve, the substantive area of 
application must be delineated so as to include all social and tax advantages, whether or 
not attached to the contract of employment’.117 Th e Court also confi rmed that so long 
as its threshold defi nition of work was reached, the worker was then entitled to social 
assistance on the same basis as nationals of the host state.118 Jobseekers were originally 
deemed not to come within the scope of Article  7(2) of the Regulation.119 However, 
despite the ‘objective diff erence’ between workers and those seeking work,120 we saw that 
Collins created a ‘hybrid system’ whereby, through the coupling of Articles 21 and 45 
TFEU: ‘[t]he interpretation of the scope of the principle of equal treatment in relation to 
access to employment must refl ect this development, as compared with the interpretation 
followed in Lebon’.121 Moreover, the Court went on to refer to the jobseekers allowance at 
issue in Collins as a social advantage with reference to Article 7(2) of the Regulation.122 
But if the recent case law considered in this comment has moved us beyond original 
specifi c expression and hybrid analyses of the relationship between Articles 18, 21 and 
45 TFEU, towards a superseding of Treaty rights and also of conditions expressed in 
legislation other than Directive 2004/38, could this have implications for citizens who 
are working or self-employed in a host state?
In the context of examining economic justifi cations for free movement restrictions, 
Spaventa outlines the basic logic that has long protected equal treatment for migrant 
workers:
EU economic migrants might draw on host State welfare provision, but they also pay into 
it through general and ad hoc contribution. It is for this reason that economic justifi cations 
cannot be relied upon in the internal market: protectionism is to be eradicated, not 
encouraged.123
117 Case 32/75 Cristini, EU:C:1975:120, para. 12–13.
118 Case 139/85 Kempf, EU:C:1986:223, para. 14: ‘a person in eff ective and genuine part-time employment 
cannot be excluded from their sphere of application merely because the remuneration he derives from 
it is below the level of the minimum means of subsistence and he seeks to supplement it by other lawful 
means of subsistence. [I]t is irrelevant whether those supplementary means of subsistence are derived 
from property or from the employment of a member of his family (…) or whether (…) they are obtained 
from fi nancial assistance drawn from the public funds of the Member State in which he resides’.
119 Case 316/85 Lebon, EU:C:1987:302, para. 26.
120 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-299/14 Garcia-Nieto, para. 76.
121 Case C-138/02 Collins, para. 64.
122 Ibid., para. 67.
123 E. Spaventa, in P. Koutrakos, N. Nic Shuibhne and P. Syrpis (eds.), Exceptions from EU Free Movement 
Law: Derogation, Justifi cation and Proportionality (Hart, forthcoming 2016), p. 34.
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She also expresses the converse implication: that the conditions requiring citizens not 
pursuing economic activity to be self-suffi  cient in order to reside lawfully in the host 
state are therefore legitimate, as are the economic considerations underpinning them.124
Th us, it is not that workers do not have to meet the condition of lawful residence in the 
host State at all; but that working there satisfi es it because Article 7(1)(a) of the Directive 
does not place any requirement of self-suffi  ciency on workers. In reality though, the 
Court’s approach to economic justifi cations has, as acknowledged by Spaventa, become 
far more fragile. As Davies explains,
[t]he assumption that those in employment are self-suffi  cient is not refl ected in many 
European societies, where signifi cant parts of the labour force may rely on support varying 
from subsidized housing and medical care to tax breaks and income top-ups.125
Th e Court has itself moved towards a more explicit articulation of the qualitative as 
well as the functional integration link that work provides to the host state in the 
context of equal treatment claims. In this trend, Giubboni identifi es seeds of ‘an 
interpretative reorientation, or detour’ that could, if consolidated further, ‘undermine 
(…) the unconditional right for migrant workers to have access to all the social benefi ts 
guaranteed by the host country’.126 Two examples allow us to test how and to what extent 
recent case law might reach into equal treatment for migrant workers: fi rst, the limitation 
in Article 24(2) of the Directive that no social assistance is payable during the fi rst three 
months of residence; and second, the phased entitlement to in-work benefi ts proposed 
as part of the political settlement for UK membership of the EU negotiated in February 
2016.
On the fi rst example, there is a presumption in the case law that the exclusion of 
entitlement to social assistance during the fi rst three months of residence does not apply 
to workers. In Garcia-Nieto, the Court stated that ‘it follows from the express wording 
of [Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38] that the host Member State may refuse to grant 
persons other than workers, self-employed persons or those who retain that status any 
social assistance during the fi rst three months of residence’.127 But there is no such 
‘express wording’ in that provision. In accordance with Article 24(1) of the Directive, 
workers do reside lawfully in a host state ‘on the basis of this Directive’ simply because 
they are workers; that does not explain why the clear and unconditional derogation from 
equal treatment in Article 24(2) of the Directive – that ‘the host Member State shall not 
be obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during the fi rst three months of 
residence’ – should not then apply to them.
124 Ibid.
125 G. Davies, ‘Migrant Union citizens and social assistance: trying to be reasonable about self-suffi  ciency’, 
College of Europe Research Papers in Law 2 (2016), https://www.coleurope.eu/study/european-legal-
studies/research-publications, p. 5.
126 See S. Giubboni, 7 Perspectives on Federalism (2015), p. 15, discussing Case C-20/12 Giersch, para. 65.
127 Case C-299/14 Garcia-Nieto, para. 44 (emphasis added).
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Turning to the second example, it was noted earlier that the February 2016 
Conclusions included a proposed amendment to Regulation 492/2011 in the form of an 
emergency brake, outlined as
an alert and safeguard mechanism that responds to situations of infl ow of workers from 
other Member States of an exceptional magnitude over an extended period of time (…). A 
Member State (…) would notify the Commission and the Council that such an exceptional 
situation exists on a scale that aff ects essential aspects of its social security system, including 
the primary purpose of its in-work benefi ts system, or which leads to diffi  culties which are 
serious and liable to persist in its employment market or are putting an excessive pressure 
on the proper functioning of its public services. On a proposal from the Commission aft er 
having examined the notifi cation and the reasons stated therein, the Council could authorise 
the Member State concerned to restrict access to non-contributory in-work benefi ts to the 
extent necessary. Th e Council would authorise that Member State to limit the access of newly 
arriving EU workers to non-contributory in-work benefi ts for a total period of up to four 
years from the commencement of employment. Th e limitation should be graduated, from an 
initial complete exclusion but gradually increasing access to such benefi ts to take account of 
the growing connection of the worker with the labour market of the host Member State.128
Had this Decision come into eff ect, and the proposed amendment to Regulation 
492/2011 proceeded in the directly discriminatory language in which it was framed (‘EU 
workers’), then noting the Court’s reluctance to deal with public interest justifi cation 
and direct discrimination in Commission v. UK, the revised legislation was very unlikely 
to have survived a legal challenge. However, had the amendments been draft ed more 
neutrally (that is, based on residence), the nature of the legal problem changes. How, 
in that case, would the relationship between Articles 18, 21 and 45 TFEU, and between 
Directive 2004/38 and Regulation 492/2011, be managed?
Noting the clear transposition of economic justifi cation to situations involving 
economic activity in the text of the Decision, refusal to listen to that public interest defence 
would have been one striking outcome. But observing how the public fi nance narrative 
has intensifi ed towards state interests over time, as traced above, makes that unlikely. 
Th is brings us back to the distinction between the ascendancy conferred on Directive 
2004/38 in recent case law, on the one hand, and how it was conferred, on the other. 
Th e originally protective status that the specifi c expression and hybrid interpretations 
wrapped around Article 45 TFEU (and Regulation 492/2011 in consequence) no longer 
seem suffi  ciently sturdy to withstand the kind of system envisaged by the 2016 Decision. 
But how far could the superseding of free movement of workers by the Directive actually 
be taken?
At the very least, it seems strange that the Decision did not explicitly require an 
amendment of Article 24(2) of the Directive at least, if not some alteration of Article 7(1)(a) 
also. Assuming that the EU legislature did in fact intend to amend Article 24(2), would 
128 See footnote 86 above.
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that be the end of the matter? Here is where the diff ering approaches of the Advocate 
General and Court in Commission v. UK could make a critical legal diff erence. If the 
logic of the Opinion were followed, then Directive 2004/38 would simply displace 
Articles 18 and 45 TFEU as a more specifi c expression of equal treatment. An appropriate 
amendment to the Directive’s text would then be the end of the matter, subject to checks 
on proportionality – and even then, not entirely rigorous checks if the weak requirements 
on evidence and proof evident in Commission v. UK were followed.
However, in that case, the Court admitted consideration of the right to reside test in 
the fi rst place since the Regulation was ‘not intended to lay down the conditions creating 
the right to social security benefi ts’.129 Regulation 492/2011 is patently intended to lay 
down the conditions for equal treatment of workers. Does that change its relationship 
to Directive 2004/38, restoring the more conventional ‘specifi c expression’ route for 
examining any proposed amendments of the Regulation, that is, against Articles 18 and 
TFEU directly? But opening up the link between equal treatment and economic activity 
would still have tested both the limits of and philosophy underpinning what, post Dano, 
the Court has told us three more times is true – to claim equal treatment rights, lawful 
residence needs to be established only in accordance with what Directive 2004/38 says 
that lawful residence means. If some form of self-suffi  ciency requirement for workers and 
self-employed persons were included in Article 7 of that measure, then it could displace 
Article 7 of Regulation 492/2011.
Events have since overtaken the February 2016 Decision. But the problems – and the 
pressures – remain. Let us not forget that the UK initiating a discussion about limiting 
the free movement of workers is not really the key point; rather, it is that 27 other Member 
States wanted – or, at least, were ready – to do it.
§4. CONCLUSION
Th e decisions in Alimanovic, Garcia-Nieto and Commission v. UK do create a consistent 
line of jurisprudence with Dano, confi rming the main premises of that judgment and 
also expanding them through application in diff erent contexts. But then, the weaknesses 
of Dano from a quality of law perspective are compounded in consequence too. 
Commentary continues to question more broadly what kind of citizenship law is being 
shaped as a result.130 Th is comment does not seek to argue that a connection between 
lawful residence and equal treatment is per se unacceptable. But how that connection 
has been developed and applied does matter. In that respect, critiques of the part played 
129 Case C-308/14 Commission v. UK, para. 65. However, for criticism of that fi nding too, see C. O’Brien, 
53 CMLRev. (2016), forthcoming.
130 E.g. examining the disconnect between citizenship and the wider EU objectives of combating poverty 
and social exclusion, see H. Verschueren, 22 MJ (2015), p. 10; on the particular implications of the case 
law for children, see C. O’Brien, 53 CMLRev. (2016), forthcoming.
Niamh Nic Shuibhne
936 23 MJ 6 (2016)
by the Court persist. But even where the restrictive case law on lawful residence and 
social benefi ts is appreciated in the fraught context of crisis-ridden welfare politics,131 
what remains more diffi  cult to condone is the extent of the distortion of quality of law 
– of legal methodology and of systemic coherence – that has been practised to reach 
the case law outcomes.132 Quality of case law is also intrinsically tied to quality of the 
legislation that underpins it: Davies is right that the legislative responsibility to regulate 
free movement well is not being fulfi lled.133
How mobility is experienced has long outgrown the basic constructs developed for 
life at a very diff erent time and in a very diff erent world. Th e appealing simplicity of the 
framework of equal treatment law undoubtedly contributed to its rooting in the legal 
and political systems of Member States. But how we exercise free movement and how we 
defi ne discrimination have changed entirely since the European Economic Community 
was fi rst conceived. People lead more complicated cross-border lives, while the legal 
components of equal treatment and free movement have barely changed. Th e minimalist 
framework of free movement law compresses legal nuances, mashes distinct concerns 
together, and generates blunt legal solutions to very diff erent practical problems. Th e 
law and legal institutions have become too remote from the facts on the ground. And 
the inherent connections between equal treatment in free movement and the ‘European 
project’ then become toxic, disaff ection with the former inevitably bleeding into the 
latter.
In the 2016 negotiations, the UK Government presented the objective of ‘renegotiating’ 
free movement from a destructive starting point that sought the dismantling of rights 
in order to reduce them, and with no regard to the wider system of EU law or its role in 
grounding the Union. By contrast, let us invert the premises of the UK challenge into 
a constructive rethinking of equal treatment and free movement law – not to reduce 
rights, but to strengthen them. For now, recent case law on lawful residence exhibits the 
surprising extent to which what we might consider to be basic EU law – how legislative 
measures interact with each other, for example – is far less worked out than thought it 
was, in EU citizenship at least.
131 E.g. A. Iliopoulou-Penot, 53 CMLRev. (2016), p. 1035.
132 E.g. C. O’Brien, 53 CMLRev. (2016), forthcoming; see further, N. Nic Shuibhne, 52 CMLRev. (2015), 
p. 935–937.
133 E.g. G. Davies, College of Europe Research Papers in Law 2 (2016), p. 25–26.
